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CASE COMMENTS
former's "unavailability at trial and proferring the testimony of other
agents may raise evidentiary problems or pose issues of prosecutional
misconduct with respect to the informer's disappearance."57 The Ameri-
can Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Jus-
tice, while approving the consent exception," voiced a similar warning
that "serious abuses" might result:
Where [electronic surveillance techniques] are employed, for
example, to avoid having to place an informant on the stand
whose full testimony might establish a defense of entrapment ...
a court might quite properly limit their use to corroboration.59
The court's decision in Tollett eliminates speculation over whether
testimony by the absent party could have aided the defendant; thus the
decision avoids problems of "fairness" of the proceeding. It provides
a practical solution to the problem of consensual interceptions while
balancing the sometimes competing interests of protecting privacy
and catching criminals.
Criminal Law-EVIDENCE-PRIOR CRIME EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE ONLY
WHEN RELEVANT TO CRIME CHARGED-Davis V. State, 276 So. 2d 846
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1973), aft'd, No. 43,874 (Fla., Feb. 15, 1974).
After a jury trial Cullen Davis was convicted of robbery and
sentenced to ten years in prison. At the trial an employee of a clean-
ing establishment testified that the defendant and another man had
robbed her of five dollars at gunpoint on December 27, 1971. The
state then profferred further testimony of a separate and independent
armed robbery; that testimony was admitted over defense counsel's
objection. The testimony consisted of two eyewitness accounts of
an armed robbery of a food store on December 22, 1971, which had
been perpetrated by a lone man wearing a woman's bikini pants
Also, another government agent overheard and testified about a conversation between
the informer and the defendant, thereby preventing the defense from using the informer
to "controvert, explain or amplify" the agent's report. Id. at 63, 64.
57. 401 U.S. at 754; cf. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 445 (1963) (concurring
opinion of Warren, C. J.), discussed in note 19 supra.
58. ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE § 4.1 (Approved Draft 1971).
59. ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE §§ 4.1, 4.2, Commentary, at 127-28 (Tent. Draft 1968). The
commentary calls this "an extrinsic abuse of an evidence gathering technique not
otherwise intrinsically objectionable," id. at 128, thus making it similar to both the
Tollett hearsay exception and the Roviaro fundamenta! fairness principle.
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over his head and concealing his hands with a blue sock and a
kitchen towel. Neither witness could clearly identify the robber be-
cause his face was hidden; both believed the robber to be Davis
because of "his build, his manner of being, and his voice,"' with
which they were familiar from Davis' previous visits to the store.
On appeal, the district court reversed and remanded, finding pre-
judicial error in the admission of the evidence of the food store
robbery. Denying a rehearing, the court emphasized the necessity
for avoiding "overprosecution" by careful application of the rule in
Williams v. State.2 The Florida Supreme Court affirmed this decision.3
The Davis decision is representative of numerous cases decided
since Williams that illustrate the apparent confusion of trial courts
regarding what evidence of prior crimes should be admitted in a crim-
inal prosecution.4 The case invites consideration of guidelines that
might be utilized to alleviate such confusion.
Florida, like all United States jurisdictions,5 has long applied
some form of the prior crime evidence rule, a unique feature of
Anglo-American jurisprudence6 Basically, the rule prohibits admis-
sion of evidence of prior crimes if its sole purpose is to demonstrate
the defendant's bad character or propensity for crime. 7 Such evi-
l. 276 So. 2d at 847.
2. 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959). The defendant, convicted of rape, had waited in a
car parked at a shopping center and had attacked the victim when she returned to
her car. At trial, evidence was admitted of a previous incident in which the defendant
had entered another parked car at the same shopping center and had attempted to molest
the returning driver. The supreme court affirmed the conviction, finding the collateral
crime directly relevant to the crime charged as showing identity and a distinct pattern.
The court held that all evidence relevant to a material issue was admissible, as long
as the sole purpose was not merely to show bad character or criminal propensity.
See also Note, Admissibility of Evidence of Prior Criminal Acts in a Criminal Prosecu-
tion, 13 U. FLA. L. REV. 372 (1960).
3. Davis v. State, No. 43,874 (Fla., Feb. 15, 1974).
4. See, e.g., Nathey v. State, 275 So. 2d 589, 590 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1973)
(Rawls, J., dissenting); Machara v. State, 272 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973);
Simmons v. Wainwright, 271 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Hirsch v. State,
268 So. 2d 441, 443 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (Rawls, J., dissenting); Clark v. State,
266 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (Rawls, J., dissenting); Franklin v. State, 229
So. 2d 892 (Fla. 3d. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); Licht v. State, 148 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1963); Hooper v. State, 115 So. 2d 769 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
5. See C. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 190, at 447-48 (2d ed. 1972); Note, Other Crimes
Evidence at Trial: Of Balancing and Other Matters, 70 YALE L.J. 763, 766 (1961).
6. See Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: England, 46 HAav.
L. REV. 954 (1933); Note, Procedural Protections of the Criminal Defendant-A Re.
evaluation of the Privilege Against Self-incrimination and the Rule Excluding Evi-
dence of Propensity to Commit Crime, 78 HARV. L. REV. 426, 435 (1964). See also People
v. Shae, 41 N.E. 505, 511 (N.Y. 1895); Slough & Knightly, Other Vices, Other Crimes,
41 IOWA L. REv. 325 & n.l (1956).
7. 1 B. JONEs, EvIDENcE § 165 (5th ed. 1958); C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 190 (2d
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dence may be highly prejudicial: s the defendant must effectively
stand trial for crimes with which he was not charged in the indict-
ment.9
Unlike some states, 10 Florida has not yet codified the rule in statu-
tory form, relying entirely upon case law to articulate its require-
ments.:" The most frequently cited case is Williams, in which the
Florida Supreme Court traced the development of the prior crime
evidence rule in Florida from the original English rule of general
admissibility-excluding only bad character or propensity evidence
12
-to the modern rule of exclusion, prohibiting all evidence of prior
crimes unless it can be subsumed under one of numerous excep-
tions to the rule.' Under the modem rule such evidence is ad-
missible only if the defendant raises the issue of his character,", or
if the prosecution can demonstrate that it tends to prove intent, 5 an
ed. 1972); 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 193-94 (3d ed. 1940). But see Carter, The Ad-
missibility of Evidence of Similar Facts, 70 LAW Q. REv. 214, 227 (1954): "It is sub-
mitted that there is no single rule which renders inadmissible any type of propensity
evidence in all cases."
8. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948); 1 J. WIGMORE, Evi-
DENCE § 194, at 650 (3d ed. 1940); E. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT 158-64
(1932) (example of an innocent defendant convicted partly because of introduction of
his criminal record at trial); Note, Other Crimes Evidence at Trial: Of Balancing
and Other Matters, 70 YALE L.J. 763 (1961).
9. See U.S. Const. amend. V; FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 16; United States v. Mitchell,
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 348, 357 (1795); 1 J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 194, at 650 (3d ed. 1940).
10. E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:445, 446 (1967); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2945.59 (Anderson 1954).
11. PROPOSED FLORIDA EVIDENCE CODE rule 90:404(2) (Preliminary Working Draft
1973), sets forth the prior crime evidence rule in essentially the same wording as PRO-
POSED FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 404 (rev. 1971). Following the Florida rule is a dis-
cussion comparing 90:404(2) with existing Florida case law. The proposed evidence code
is expected to come before the Florida Legislature at its next session.
12. 110 So. 2d at 658. In his thorough study of the history and development of
the exclusion of prior crime evidence rule, Justice Stone calls this formulation the
original English rule, which prevailed in America until about 1840, then gave way
to the so-called "spurious rule," one of exclusion with many exceptions. Stone, The
Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51 HARV. L. REV. 988, 990 (1938).
13. 110 So. 2d at 661. For compilations of exceptions, see Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S.
554, 560-61 (1967) (listing cases); C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 190-91 (2d ed. 1972);
Slough & Knightly, Other Vices, Other Crimes, 41 IowA L. REv. 325, 326 (1956).
14. E.g., Coston v. State, 190 So. 520 (Fla. 1939). This rule was judicially adopted
in Florida as early as 1886 in Mann v. State, 22 Fla. 600 (1886). See also 13 FLA. JUIL
Evidence § 152 (1957). Impeachment of a defendant's character after he has put it
in issue is beyond the scope of this comment. Different considerations are involved,
since the defendant has initial control over the introduction of the character issue. Cf.
Note, Other Crimes Evidence at Trial: Of Balancing and Other Matters, 70 YALE L.J.
763, 775-78 nn. 68-91 (1961).
15. E.g., Simring v. State, 77 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1955).
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element of the crime, 6 identity, 7 malice, 8 motive9 or a system of
criminal activity.2 0 By 1959, the year Williams was decided, the ex-
ceptions had grown so numerous that the rule had in effect again
become one of general admissibility.21
The Davis court applied the following language from Williams
as the rule:
"[Elvidence revealing other crimes is admissible if it casts light upon
the character of the act under investigation by showing motive,
intent, absence of mistake, common scheme, identity or a system or
general pattern of criminality so that the evidence of the prior
offenses would have a relevant or a material bearing on some
essential aspect of the offense being tried. '" 22
Although it stresses relevancy, the excerpt from the Williams case
is still phrased in terms of the old exceptions. The manner in
which trial courts apply these exceptions to test relevancy appears
to create confusion and reversible error. The language of Williams
focused on by the Davis court in its denial of rehearing might prove
helpful in guiding lower courts: " 'The question to be decided is
not whether the evidence tends to point to another crime but rather
whether it is relevant to the crime charged.' "22
The temptation to the trial judge to admit evidence of prior
crimes that falls neatly into one of the categories established by
stare decisis could lead to admission of prejudicial evidence that is
16. E.g., Kennedy v. State, 191 So. 193 (Fla. 1939).
17. E.g., Talley v. State, 36 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 1948).
18. E.g., Lindsey v. United States, 227 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 1008 (1956) (applying Florida law).
19. E.g., Zalla v. State, 61 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1952).
20. E.g., Winstead v. State, 91 So. 2d 809 (Fla. 1956).
21. 110 So. 2d at 659. It is questionable whether the rule as implemented is as
broad as the original English rule, phrased as it is in terms of the exceptions. The
court in Williams apparently intended the broad rule to apply, under which any
truly relevant evidence should be admitted. Some cases seem to create little difficulty
for the trial courts in applying that rule. See, e.g., Ashley v. State, 265 So. 2d 685 (Fla.
1972); Baker v. State, 241 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 1970); Hawkins v. State, 206 So. 2d 5 (Fla.
1968). Yet, as evidenced by the cases reversed on appeal, other trial courts fall into
error by using the exceptions as the sole parameters of relevancy, without further
inquiry. See, e.g., Machara v. State, 272 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973);
Simmons v. Wainwright, 271 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
22. 276 So. 2d it 847, quoting from Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654, 662 (Fla.
1959).
23. 276 So. 2d at 849, quoting from Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654, 663 (Fla.
1959).
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not relevant. 4 The stress in Williams was placed on relevancy, which
the trial judge was mandated to consider carefully and cautiously. 25
24. See notes 8 & 21 supra. One author states: "Relevance is primarily a matter of
logic and experience rather than of law. But the law prescribes a minimum quantum
of probative value for evidence before it will regard it as relevant." Carter, The Ad-
missibility of Evidence of Similar Facts, 70 LAW Q. REv. 214, 217 (1954). Cf. Wadsworth
v. State, 201 So. 2d 836, 838 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1967). An exceptionally cogent
analysis of relevancy appears in Trautman, Logical or Legal Relevancy-A Conflict in
Theory, 5 VAND. L. REV. 385 (1952). Trautman suggests a dual test for determining
relevancy that resolves many apparently conflicting opinions. First, logical relevancy is
evaluated to ascertain whether some connection exists between the prior crime evidence
and a material fact in issue, similar to those set forth under exceptions to the old rule
of exclusion. The second step weighs the probative value of the prior crime evidence
against policy reasons for its exclusion-undue prejudice; surprise to the defendant,
who must defend against a charge of which he lacked notice; confusion of issues; un-
necessary consumption of the court's time. Id. at 393. This dual test is probably the
one the Florida Supreme Court intended in Williams. But as Trautman notes, applica-
tion of this test is delicate and difficult, making it far easier for the trial court to rely
solely on precedent. The resulting danger is that the relevancy test is effectively dis-
pensed with, along with the necessity of determining on a case-by-case basis whether
"disproportionate policy risks" exist.
Reasoning along similar lines, another author proposed that the prosecutor
be required to work out the chain of inference from the collateral crime to the crime
charged. Lacy, Admissibility of Evidence of Crimes Not Charged in the Indictment,
31 ORE. L. REV. 267, 285-86 (1952). In addition to revealing irrelevant evidence, this
could aid in clarifying the prosecution's case, for the prosecution often "offers such evi-
dence partly, perhaps largely, for its prejudicial value, and partly because of a vague intui-
tion that it has some bearing on the case." Id. at 286. He supports his skeptical view of trial
courts' adequacies in the area by citing Tyree, Annual Survey of New Jersey Law-Evi-
dence, 6 RuTGERs L. REv. 290 (1951), wherein every relevant decision studied merely
applied precedent, without any indication that the principles behind the precedent had
been examined. Lacy, supra at 296 n.100.
The definition of relevancy has been stretched especially thin to admit evidence of
prior sexual offenses in prosecutions for sex crimes. "[C]ourts have lost all feeling for tra-
dition and the meaning of prejudice when applying rules of exclusion in prosecutions
for sex offenses. A strong line of authorities today holds that evidence of other crimes
is admissible for the purpose of showing a degenerate disposition, a lustful disposition,
or an inclination to commit sexual offenses." Slough & Knightly, Other Vices, Other
Crimes, 41 IOWA L. REv. 325, 333 (1956). Thus, evidence with the sole function of in-
fluencing the jury by depicting the defendant's bad character is admitted. See Nathey v.
State, 275 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (Rawls, J., dissenting); Clark v.
State, 266 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (Rawls, J., dissenting) (per curiam
decisions affirming convictions of rape and incest). The justification for admitting such
evidence apparently is a general belief that sex offenders have a high recidivism rate
and that past offenses thus make the commission of the charged offense more likely. A
Federal Bureau of Investigation report does not bear this out, listing rapists as nineteenth
on a recidivism list of twenty-five different crimes. Slough & Schwinn, The Sexual Psy-
chopath, 19 KAN. CITY L. REV. 131, 137 n.19 (1951).
25. 110 So. 2d at 663. Further scrutiny by the judge might include as part of the
relevancy test that only like crimes, against the same general class of persons, at about
the same time should be admissible under the old list of exceptions. This would elimin-
ate very remote or totally different crimes. See, e.g., Talley v. State, 36 So. 2d 201, 205
(Fla. 1948).
FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
In Davis the court of appeal, in contrast to the trial court, con-
ducted a careful examination of relevancy. The district court found
no justification for admitting the evidence of the food store robbery.
Since the testimony did not tend to prove intent, common scheme,
general pattern of criminal behavior or any other exception under
the old rule, it was "utterly irrelevant to any issue involved in the
crime charged."26 The prosecutor's contention that the evidence
tended to show identity was considered a "gross misconception of
the law. ' ' 27 The admission of this evidence by the trial court pro-
vides a clear example of how blind application of exceptions to the
general rule of exclusion can lead to error. The bare statement of a
recognized exception apparently satisfied the trial court, without any
further consideration of how this evidence could show identity.28
Admission of the food store robbery testimony resulted only in sug-
gesting to the jury that the defendant had a propensity for crime,
the one purpose clearly forbidden by the rule.
Implicit in the Davis decision is the requirement that the proba-
tive value of admitted evidence outweigh the possibility of prejudic-
ing the jury.29 To measure prejudice, the district court looked beyond
the evidence itself to the manner in which it was presented to the
jury. Whatever immeasurable prejudice against the defendant was
aroused by the admitted prior crime evidence, it apparently was
compounded by the method of presentation. The testimony of the
witnesses to the food store robbery consumed twenty-five pages of
the transcript, compared with only thirteen pages of testimony by
26. 276 So. 2d at 849.
27. Id. On appeal to the supreme court, the prosecution contended that the failure
to object to the prior crime testimony in the defense brief constituted waiver. This
argument was rejected because, as a so-called Anders appeal, the scope of the district
court's review was not limited to matters raised by defendant's state-appointed counsel.
See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). See also note 43 infra.
The court further found that objection to the prior crime testimony had been
raised sufficiently at trial, citing Franklin v. State, 229 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1970), for a restatement of the Williams rule. The cited language from Franklin first
places the burden on the defense to object to admission of the evidence, then requires
the prosecution to show that the evidence is relevant if it is to be admitted. The prose-
cution in Davis failed to meet this burden. See notes 45-47 and accompanying text infra,
suggesting that proposed guidelines could alter this burden.
28. One author has traced the thought process that leads courts to err in applying
the exceptions as the sole test for relevancy: "[T]he prosecution offers to put in such
evidence to show [e.g.] intent. Hence the evidence is admissible. Obviously what has
happened here is that the meaning of 'to show intent' has changed from 'relevant
to show intent' to 'for the purpose of showing intent.' " Stone, The Rule of Exclusion
of Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51 HARV. L. REV. 988, 1007 (1938).
29. 276 So. 2d at 848. For sources discussing jury prejudice, see note 8 supra.
(Vol. 2
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the eyewitness to the crime charged.-0 While volume of testimony
alone is not necessarily prejudicial, 31 the food store robbery "trans-
cended the bounds of relevancy to the charge being tried" and be-
came a "feature" of the trial instead of an "incident. ' '3 2 The opinion
does not indicate whether an instruction was requested or given
limiting to the determination of identity the jury's consideration of
the prior crime evidence. In view of the total irrelevancy of the
testimony, and the questionable effectiveness of jury instructions,3
it is doubtful that such a charge-if one had been made-would have
altered the result on appeal.34
The Davis court noted with dismay the "flood of avoidable ap-
peals" that stem from similar overprosecution in cases that would
otherwise result in unassailable convictions.3 5 However, both the district
court and the supreme court stopped short of proposing any specific
guidelines to alleviate the problem, merely suggesting that a close re-
reading of Williams could serve to clarify the law.36
A recent Fourth District Court of Appeal dissenting opinion
went further, advocating judicial adoption of limiting guidelines.
In Thomasson v. State,3 7 Judge Walden dissented from a per curiam
30. 276 So. 2d at 848.
31. See Green v. State, 228 So. 2d 397, 399 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
32. Williams v. State, 117 So. 2d 473, 475 (Fla. 1960).
33. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 53, at 121-23 (2d ed. 1972); J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 988,
at 920 (3d. ed. 1940). Judge Learned Hand characterized limiting instructions as "the
recommendation to the jury of a mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only their
powers, but anybody's else [sic]." Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 285 U.S. 556 (1932).
Many defense attorneys prefer no instructions at all, feeling that they can only
aggravate the effect of such evidence on the jury. See United States v. Tramaglino, 197
F.2d 928, 932 n.2 (2d Cir. 1952). Jury studies show that jurors failed to segregate evi-
dence of a prior record introduced for impeachment and used it instead as an indication
that the defendant "was a bad man and hence was more likely than not guilty of the
charged crime." Letter from Dale W. Broader, Associate Professor, The University of
Nebraska College of Law, to the Yale Law Journal, March 14, 1960, on file in Yale
Law Library, cited in Note, Other Crimes Evidence at Trial: Of Balancing and Other
Matters, 70 YALE L.J. 763, 777 n.89 (1961). Cf. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453
(1949), wherein Justice Jackson, concurring, called the notion that prejudicial effects
can be overcome by jury instructions "unmitigated fiction." See also H. KALVEN & H. ZE1SEL,
THE AMERuCAN JURY 178-79 (1966).
34. Cf. State v. Knowles, 498 P.2d 40 (Kan. 1972) (holding that giving limiting in-
structions not of sufficient benefit that its absence is prejudicial error); 12 WASHBURN L.J.
111 (1972).
35. 276 So. 2d at 848.
36. No. 43,874 at 8-9; 276 So. 2d at 848. Under FLA. CoNsr. art. V, § 3, procedural
court rules are the special province of the supreme court. Since guidelines governing
the method of determining the admissibility of prior crime evidence are essentially
procedural, they would be beyond the scope of both the proposed evidence code and
legislative action.
37. 277 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
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opinion affirming the conviction of a defendant on the charge of
uttering a forged check, where evidence of three other allegedly
forged checks had been admitted at trial. The only apparent con-
nection between the defendant and the checks was the fact that his
fingerprints were on them, with the prosecution offering neither ex-
planation of how or when his prints were left there nor evidence
that the defendant had done anything but touch the checks. De-
ploring the increasingly liberal application of the Williams rule in
undermining the rights of the accused, Judge Walden suggested
imposition of "explicit safeguards," citing as exemplary the following
measures recently adopted by the Louisiana Supreme Court:
"When the State intends to offer evidence of other criminal
offenses under the exceptions outlined in R.S. 15:445 and 446:
(1) The State shall within a reasonable time before trial
furnish in writing to the defendant a statement of the acts or
offenses it intends to offer, describing same with the general par-
ticularity required of an indictment or information. No such
notice is required as to evidence of offenses which are a part of
the res gestae, or convictions used to impeach defendant's testimony.
(2) In the written statement the State shall specify the ex-
ception to the general exclusionary rule upon which it relies for
the admissibility of the evidence of other acts or offenses.
(3) Prerequisite to the admissibility of the evidence is a show-
ing by the State that the evidence of other crimes is not merely
repetitive and cumulative, is not a subterfuge for depicting the
defendant's bad character or his propensity for bad behavior, and
that it serves the actual purpose for which it is offered.
(4) When the evidence is admitted before the jury, the court,
if requested by defense counsel, shall charge the jury as to the
limited purpose for which the evidence is received and is to be
considered.
(5) Moreover, the final charge to the jury shall contain a
charge of the limited purpose for which the evidence was received,
and the court shall at this time advise the jury that the defendant
cannot be convicted for any charge other than the one named
in the indictment or one responsive thereto."38
The first provision would remedy notice difficulties by apprising
the defendant of the prior crime evidence to be used against him
38. Id. at 300, quoting from State v. Prieur, 277 So. 2d 126, 130 (La. 1973). Rules for
admissibility of prior crime evidence in Louisiana are codified in LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§
15:44546 (1967).
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at trial.39 Notice is particularly necessary when unprosecuted actions
or prosecutions resulting in acquittals are involved, since a defendant
could not be expected to prepare an explanation for all his past ac-
tions. The requirement of notice is rightly dispensed with when
evidence of offenses is clearly within the defendant's knowledge as
part of the res gestae, or when the defendant controls the admissibili-
ty of prior convictions by putting his character in issue.40 The
Minnesota Supreme Court, which adopted a similar rule in 1965,
added the exception that no notice need be given of previous prose-
cutions.41 This would seem to conflict with the intent of the rule-
to prepare the defendant to meet otherwise unexpected accusations.
While rules of discovery, such as Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
3.220 (1973), may have sufficiently broad scope to permit the de-
fendant to determine on his own initiative what crimes are to be intro-
duced, 42 there is no assurance that the defendant will always, or even
usually, retain counsel diligent enough to do this.43 The providing of
notice appears a light enough burden for the state to bear.4 4 In fact, the
39. See note 9 supra, citing constitutional requirements of notice. Technically, spe-
cific notice is required only for the crimes actually being prosecuted; the effect of ad-
mission of some prior crime evidence, however, is to allow the jury to try the de-
fendant on the basis of all crimes that he has ever committed. See, e.g., Nathey v. State,
275 So. 2d 589, 590 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (Rawls, J., dissenting). Judge Rawls
concluded that "prosecution officials indicted a defendant for a specified crime and
tried and convicted him for his proclivity to commit heinous offenses of every type and
nature during his adult lifetime." Accord, Simmons v. Wainwright, 271 So. 2d 464 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1973). See Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Ad-
vantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1175-76 & n.83 (1960), for instances
of relaxation of the requirement of punishment only for the crime charged.
40. See note 14 supra. For critiques of impeachment by prior convictions as treated
in the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, see Spector, Impeaching the Defendant by
His Prior Convictions and The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: A Half Step For-
ward and Three Steps Backward, 1 LoyoLA Cu. L.J. 247 (1970); Glick, Impeachment by
Prior Convictions: A Critique of Rule 6-09 of The Proposed Rules of Evidence for U.S.
District Courts, 6 CRIM. L. BULL. 330 (1970).
41. State v. Spreigl, 139 N.W.2d 167, 173 (Minn. 1965). Justice Gordon of the Wis-
consin Supreme Court, going even further, would admit only prior convictions as the
only procedure that could comply with the presumed innocence of the defendant. See
State v. Reynolds, 137 N.W.2d 14, 19 (Wis. 1965) (Gordon, J., concurring); 51 MARQ. L.
Rav. 104, 109 (1967).
42. For a discussion of the more limited discovery available to a criminal defendant
under the Federal Rules Of Criminal Procedure, see Goldstein, The State and the Ac-
cused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1180-81 & n.100,
1182-85 (1960), citing with approval former FLA. STAT. § 909.18 (1961), which is present-
ly FLA. R. CalM. P. 3.220 (1973).
43. In the Davis case, for example, the court reversed defendant's conviction virtual-
ly sua sponte, noting that neither the public defender's nor the State's brief was of
any assistance on appeal, and that the performance of defense counsel amounted to no
defense at all. 276 So. 2d at 847, 849.
44. But see State v. Prieur, 277 So. 2d 126, 134 (La. 1973) (Summers, J., dissenting),
1974]
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guideline could be phrased with even greater particularity along the
lines of the notice of alibi requirement in Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.200 (1973).
The second requirement-specification of the applicable excep-
tion to the rule of exclusion-would contribute little to existing
Florida law, except that it would place an affirmative burden on the
prosecution to justify admissibility, instead of requiring justification
for prior crime evidence only when the admissibility is challenged.
Requirement three could contribute significantly to curbing pro-
secutorial excesses. While requirement two would allow the prosecu-
tion simply to specify the applicable exception, number three re-
quires the extra step that seems to be omitted in erroneous trial
court determinations of admissibility-a close examination of rele-
vancy. Under this rule, the trial judge could not merely take the
prosecutor's word or rely upon stare decisis. The state would have to
demonstrate clearly the relevancy of its evidence. Requiring the evi-
dence to be "not merely repetitive or cumulative" could be most
effective in excluding prior crime evidence where the issue claimed
to be proved thereby can be shown by other, less prejudicial
evidence.45 In Davis, for example, the state had testimony concerning
the crime charged from a woman who saw Davis on two occasions
the day of the robbery, remembered his clothing exactly, observed
him for several minutes and positively identified him as the robber.4 6
Even if the collateral crime could have shown identity as the prose-
cution alleged, it would have been merely cumulative and thus ex-
cludable because of the possibility of unnecessarily prejudicing the
jury.4  Model Code of Evidence rule 303 embodies the same
philosophy by attempting to reduce the mechanical approach of
applying a list of exceptions, the result under Uniform Rule of Evi-
dence 55. 41
criticizing this and the other four requirements for unduly hindering the prosecution,
for placing the entire burden on the State with no corresponding duty placed on the
defendant and for allowing defendant a pretrial examination of the prosecution's evi-
dence, previously not permitted in Louisiana.
45. Cf. 276 So. 2d at 848-49. See also Note, Procedural Protections of the Criminal
Defendant-A Reevaluation of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and the Rule
Excluding Evidence of Propensity to Commit Crime, 78 HARV. L. REv. 426, 435-51 (1964).
46. 276 So. 2d at 849.
47. See note 24 supra.
48. See generally 51 MARQ. L. REv. 105, 107 (1967). It has been suggested
that a procedural rule such as rule three in the Prieur decision could contribute little
to the existing case law that has sought to delineate the manner in which a trial judge
should determine relevancy of prior crime evidence. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 110
So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959); Green v. State, 190 So. 2d 42, 46 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
Accordingly, it would seem doubtful that a procedural rule could be phrased any more
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While requirements four and five, providing for requested and
mandatory jury instructions may clarify what evidence the jury is
to disregard, the value of such instructions is doubtful. There is
widespread distrust of the effectiveness of limiting instructions, even
to the extent that some defense counsel would prefer to do without
them altogether rather than call the jury's attention to prejudicial
testimony.49 By removing presently available grounds for objection
and appeal without alleviating the damage to the defendant, these
two provisions have a potential for more harm than good."
It should be noted, however, that the instruction is to be given
at the time the evidence is admitted only at the request of defense
counsel. If the fifth requirement were to include such a caveat, the
potential for harm-if defense counsel believes such potential exists-
could easily be removed by simply refraining from requesting the
instruction both at the time the evidence is admitted and at the close
of the trial. Compliance with the first three requirements at a pretrial
hearing would greatly diminish the chance of prejudicing the jury
with prior crime evidence. Under present procedures the jury is
likely to be exposed to the prejudicial evidence even before a deter-
mination of admissibility has been made.51
Statutes and evidence codes are generally adequate for a statement
of the rule on prior crime evidence, but do not seem to provide the de-
tailed guidance that is apparently needed in application of the rules.
5 2
helpfully or applied with greater diligence than the common law guidelines. Interview
with Charles W. Ehrhardt, Reporter to the Florida Law Revision Council, in Tallahassee,
November 5, 1973.
On the other hand, since the relevancy test is not always applied, reformulation into
a procedural rule might call more attention to the necessity for evaluating relevancy
and place a greater burden on the prosecution to justify admission of prior crime
evidence.
49. See note 33 supra.
50. See, e.g., Roberson v. State, 24 So. 474 (Fla. 1898); Green v. State, 228 So. 2d
397 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
51. For examples of abuse of prior crime evidence by the prosecutor, particularly
in opening statement and closing argument, see, e.g., Simmons v. Wainwright, 271 So. 2d
464, 465 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Clark v. State, 266 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1972) (Rawls, J., dissenting). See also Note, Other Crime Evidence at Trial: Of
Balancing and Other Matters, 70 YALE L.J. 763, 782-85 (1961) (suggesting complete
transcription of the opening statement and closing argument as a curb against abuses,
a stern reprimand from the bench and a statement to the jury that the offending alle-
gation is false); Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 84-89 & n.0 (1935) (citing adverse
comment on the trial excesses of prosecutors).
52. The Louisiana Supreme Court, for example, felt that the statutory law govern-
ing prior crime evidence required supplementation with more specific procedures. See
State v. Prieur, 277 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973). See also PRorosFD FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE
404 (rev. 1971); MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rules 303-11 (1942); UNIFORM RULE OF EvI-
DENCE 55 (1953). Of these the most helpful phrasing of the prior evidence rule is rule
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If problems such as those illustrated by Davis are to be avoided, judicial
adoption of effective guidelines appears necessary. As one court has
noted, "this being a matter of judgment, it is quite likely that courts
would not always agree, and that some courts might see a logical
connection where others could not."5 3 The least that can be done to
reduce inconsistency, and the subsequent infringement on the defen-
dant's right to a fair trial, is to provide the trial judge with a more
explicit framework upon which to base his determinations of rele-
vance and admissibility.
303 of the Model Code of Evidence, with its heavy stress on relevance. But even that
rule does not establish any concrete procedures for the trial court to follow; regulation
of procedural matters is not a function of an evidence code. Indeed, in Florida only
the supreme court can incorporate such guidelines into the rules of criminal procedure.
See note 36 supra.
53. State v. Lapage, 57 N.H. 245, 295 (1876).
